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diverts a fraction of its output. Better investor protection decreases stock holdings of con-
trolling shareholders, increases stock mean-returns, and increases stock return volatilities
when ownership concentration is sufficiently high, consistent with the related empirical evi-
dence. The model also predicts that better protection increases interest rates and decreases
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1. Introduction
In many countries corporations are dominated by controlling shareholders who can divert
resources for their private benefit. Consequently, the protection of minority shareholders
against expropriation by controlling shareholders is of much importance for understanding
ownership concentration and asset prices. In line with this observation, the empirical litera-
ture documents significant effects of investor protection on asset prices and their dynamics.
However, an overarching theory that sheds light simultaneously on the effects of investor pro-
tection on the firm ownership concentration, stock returns, interest rates, personal leverage,
risk sharing, and extent of expropriation is missing in the literature. In this paper, we de-
velop such a theory in a parsimonious general equilibrium setting and use it to address some
of the empirical evidence on asset holdings of controlling shareholders and stock returns, and
to provide new predictions.
The dynamic accumulation of control and the ability of shareholders to trade and share
risks are key features of our analysis which play a leading role in determining the effects of
investor protection on asset holdings and returns. Due to these key features, our analysis
generates rich dynamics of asset holdings and returns, and reveals that the excess owner-
ship concentration (relative to the full investor protection benchmark) is the main channel
through which investor protection influences stock mean-returns, volatilities, interest rates,
and the controlling shareholder’s leverage. In particular, we find that the stock holdings
of controlling shareholders change in response to economic shocks and decrease with better
investor protection, stock mean-returns increase with better protection, and stock return
volatilities also increase with better protection when ownership concentration is sufficiently
high. We relate these results to empirical findings and formulate additional predictions
below.
We consider a dynamic general equilibrium economy with a representative competitive
firm that produces an exogenous stream of output. The firm’s stock is owned by two types
of shareholders with heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, a
minority shareholder and a controlling shareholder who can divert a fraction of the firm’s
output for himself. The diverted fraction satisfies an investor protection constraint, which
limits the scope of available diversion strategies. This constraint becomes tighter with better
protection and looser with higher stock holdings that increase the controlling shareholder’s
power over the firm. The diversion of output is further tempered by pecuniary costs of
stealing. We provide tractable expressions for the equilibrium processes that admit intuitive
comparative statics and are explicit up to the controlling shareholder’s stock holding, which
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is found numerically.
We find that the controlling shareholder’s stock holding is larger in economies with imper-
fect investor protection than in economies with full protection. Intuitively, poor protection
expands the set of diversion strategies and increases the potential gains from higher control
power over the firm, which induces buying more shares. However, the relationship between
investor protection and optimal stock holdings is non-monotonic and depends on whether
the investor protection constraint binds or not. This is because investor protection has two
opposing effects on the controlling shareholder’s optimal portfolio decision. An increase in
investor protection reduces the marginal benefit of control and hence reduces the incentive
to acquire more shares, while on the other hand, makes the investor protection constraint
relevant for a wider range of stock holdings thereby providing an incentive to acquire more
shares to relax the constraint. The relative importance of these effects depends on the con-
sumption share of the minority shareholder, which acts as an endogenous state variable in
the model. We also find that the shareholders’ stock holdings change in response to economic
shocks. In particular, the controlling shareholder is more exposed to stock market fluctua-
tions because he invests a larger fraction of wealth in stocks than the minority shareholder.
Consequently, the controlling shareholder sells stocks to finance consumption in bad times,
when the firm output is hit by negative shocks, and buys them back in good times.
The acquisition of the controlling shareholder’s shares is financed by personal leverage,
and hence this leverage is higher in economies with imperfect protection. We establish a
tight link between the personal leverage and stock holdings of the controlling shareholder.
In particular, the leverage-stock price ratio in our model is simply given by the controlling
shareholder’s excess ownership concentration, defined as the stock holding over and above
his holding in the full protection economy. We also show that the fraction of diverted output
is a hump-shaped function of the shares held by the controlling shareholder. In our model,
a higher stock holding relaxes the investor protection constraint by increasing the control
power over the firm, and the controlling shareholder diverts more as his holding increases.
On the other hand, the higher stock holding decreases his incentive to divert due to pecuniary
costs of stealing. After some point, the investor protection constraint no longer binds and
the equilibrium amount of diverted output decreases with the stock holding.
We demonstrate that the stock mean-return decreases with poor investor protection in
equilibrium. The intuition is that, in contrast to the minority shareholder, the controlling
shareholder is compensated for holding risky assets not only by the risk premium but also by
the fraction of the diverted output. Therefore, the controlling shareholder hoards shares even
if the realized risk premium is low, which drives down the stock mean-return in equilibrium.
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Following this intuition, we show that the asset holdings of the controlling shareholder are
determined by a previously unexplored quantity, which we refer to as the effective risk
premium. We decompose the effective risk premium into a conventional risk premium implied
by stock price dynamics and an additional term capturing the diverted output per share. In
our decomposition the diverted output per share can be interpreted as an adjustment to the
dividend that is received by the controlling shareholder.
We also show that the equilibrium stock return volatility is higher with imperfect pro-
tection than with full protection and exceeds the volatility of the aggregate output. Another
novel prediction of our model is that across economies with varying imperfect protection,
the relation between volatility and investor protection is non-monotone, and when the stock
holding of the controlling shareholder is sufficiently high the volatility is higher in economies
with better protection. We find that the excess volatility relative to the full protection bench-
mark economy is proportional to the excess personal leverage-stock price ratio relative to
the benchmark, and to the best of our knowledge, such a simple characterization of volatility
in terms of personal leverage is new to the literature. Intuitively, personal leverage finances
the acquisition of shares by the controlling shareholder when protection is low, and hence
increases the sensitivity of the controlling shareholder’s wealth to economic shocks, which
translates into higher stock return volatility via the state variable that tracks wealth inequal-
ity. The non-monotonicity of volatilities with respect to investor protection is explained by
the non-monotonicity of the stock holdings, which determine personal leverage, as discussed
earlier.
Furthermore, we find that the risk-free interest rates decrease with lower protection due
to the following two effects in equilibrium. First, because of low risk premium and high
volatility, the minority shareholder turns to bond markets and is more willing to provide
cheap credit. Second, the acquisition of shares by the controlling shareholder is partially
covered by the diverted output, which moderates his demand for credit. These two effects are
partially offset by the surge of the controlling shareholder’s leverage under poor protection,
which increases the demand for borrowing, but the net effect on the equilibrium interest rate
is negative.
The effects of investor protection on stock holdings of controlling shareholders, stock
mean-returns and volatilities in our model go in the same direction as in the related empirical
literature. In particular, this literature finds that the controlling shareholder’s stock holdings
are larger in economies with lower investor protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer, 1999) and change in response to economic shocks (e.g., Denis and Sarin, 1999;
Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan, 1999). Moreover, it shows that the expected stock
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returns are negatively related to investor protection as measured by the degree of corporate
governance, entrenchment and managerial perks (e.g., Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003;
Yermack, 2006; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009; Daines, Gow and Larcker, 2010, among
others), although there is an ongoing discussion of the robustness of this relation (Core,
Guay and Rusticus, 2006; Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang, 2013).
We contribute to this discussion by providing a theoretical argument in favor of the positive
relation between the stock mean-return and investor protection. The empirical literature
also finds that the stock return volatility is higher in economies with better protection (e.g.,
Morck, Yeung and Yu, 2000; Jin and Myers, 2006; Bartram, Brown and Stulz, 2012), similar
to our model when ownership concentration is sufficiently high.
We note that the above empirical literature does not explore the link between the dynam-
ics of ownership concentration and the observed effects of investor protection on the stock
mean-returns and volatilities, as predicted by our model. Therefore, further empirical work
would be needed to better match the empirical evidence on investor protection to this pre-
diction. Additional new testable predictions of our model include a higher personal leverage
of controlling shareholders and lower risk-free interest rates when investor protection is low,
the non-monotonicity of stock return volatility with respect to investor protection, and the
link between excess volatility and excess personal leverage in the economy with imperfect
protection.
Finally, we study the equilibrium effects of the pecuniary costs of stealing such as bribes,
fines payable if controlling shareholders are caught stealing, payments to lawyers and other
expenses for arranging diversion schemes. We find that a higher pecuniary cost of stealing
is associated with a higher stock gross return and interest rate, and a lower volatility and
stock holding of the controlling shareholder. We also consider an extension of our analysis
to incorporate cross-firm differences in investor protection, albeit in a simple one-period
economy. We show that our earlier results on stock holdings, mean-returns, and interest
rates remain valid. We additionally find that cross-firm differences in investor protection give
rise to a positive investor protection premium, defined as the spread between mean-returns
of stocks with higher and lower protection. This result is particularly valuable because
much of the empirical evidence on the positive relation between stock returns and investor
protection (discussed above) is for cross-sections of firms with different levels of investor
protection whereas our main analysis features a representative firm. We also consider other
extensions of our analysis that feature alternative stealing technologies and non-pecuniary
costs of diverting output. We find that all our results on the effects of investor protection
remain qualitatively the same.
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Our paper also makes a methodological contribution by integrating a model with corpo-
rate frictions such as investor protection and acquisition of control into a general equilibrium
asset pricing framework, albeit in a pure-exchange setting.1 Solving models with frictions
such as constraints on certain choice variables is a daunting task. We achieve tractability by
allowing investors to optimize two-period CRRA preferences repeated over time, similar to
models with myopic investors and overlapping generations. This approach allows us to fo-
cus on the effects of investor protection and abstract away from hedging demands for stocks,
which are more relevant for the portfolio choice literature. However, we demonstrate that the
equilibrium processes in the full protection benchmark economy share some features of dy-
namic Lucas-type (1978) economies with heterogeneous investors. In particular, the Sharpe
ratio in the latter economy and our model have the same structure. A notable feature of
our model is that it is stationary in the sense that both shareholders survive in the long run
and the distributions of their consumption shares are non-degenerate. The stationarity is
achieved by endowing shareholders with non-financial labor incomes, since future incomes
help investors gradually accumulate wealth and our preference specification keeps investors’
wealth positive, restricting financial losses.
1.1. Related Literature
The most related to our paper are the works that study asset pricing implications of investor
protection against expropriation by controlling shareholders. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)
introduce a static model that explains why firms are larger and more valuable with better
investor protection. Albuquerque and Wang (2008) develop a dynamic production economy
with buy-and-hold controlling shareholders who extract more benefits in larger firms. They
show that weaker investor protection implies over-investment which leads to higher stock risk
premia, volatility, and interest rates. The stock mean-returns, volatility, and interest rates
are constant due to the absence of trading between shareholders. Giannetti and Koskinen
(2010) study a static model of two countries with different levels of investor protection, where
investors make portfolio decisions at the initial date and do not rebalance their portfolios.
They find that stock returns decrease with weaker protection, similar to our paper. We
complement these works by focusing on different aspects of investor protection arising due
to its effects on asset demands and accumulation of control. In particular, the controlling
shareholder in our model extracts private benefits by dynamically increasing his stock holding
1Focusing on a pure-exchange setting allows us to incorporate trading between different groups of share-
holders in a tractable way. As discussed below, a general equilibrium production economy with investor
protection and a buy-and-hold controlling shareholder has been studied by Albuquerque and Wang (2008).
5
in the firm whereas in these works the stock holding is fixed. Consequently, we uncover new
economic forces that decrease stock mean-returns and interest rates when investor protection
is low, leading also to excess stock return volatility, personal leverage, time-variation of all
equilibrium processes and wealth transfers between different categories of shareholders.
Our paper is also related to the literature where the stock holdings of controlling share-
holders are endogenous and influence managerial incentives and firm output in a dynamic
setting. DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) and Gorton, He, and Huang (2014) present models
with stock trading and risk sharing between a controlling shareholder and small investors.
The controlling shareholder in these models trades dynamically and accounts for the rela-
tionship between her stock holding on one hand and effort level, firm output, and stock price
on the other. In particular, the latter paper shows that stock mean-returns and volatility
increase or decrease depending on investors’ risk aversions. Haddad (2015) studies a dy-
namic model with endogenous ownership concentration where active shareholders increase
the output mean-growth rate and are compensated by the firm for being under-diversified.
He shows that active capital amplifies stock-return volatility. Jung, Subramanian, and Zeng
(2016) study a model where a large shareholder faces a tradeoff between diversification and
incentive provision to firm managers determining the value of the firm. Our paper differs
from these works in that we focus on the economic effects of investor protection in a setting
where the controlling shareholder’s power over the firm and the ability to divert output de-
pend on his stock holdings. As a result, we uncover several new economic effects of investor
protection on excess ownership concentration, mean-returns, volatility, interest rates, and
personal leverage.
Also related to our paper are various works that share some of the key features of our
analysis such as investor protection, expropriation of minority shareholders, and endogenous
ownership concentration. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) consider a static model where
controlling shareholders of firms with growth opportunities reduce their cost of capital by
cross-listing firms in the U.S., which commits them to better investor protection. Doidge,
Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) show, both theoretically and empirically, the importance of coun-
try characteristics for the quality of investor protection. Dow, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy
(2005) study a model with the separation of ownership and control where firm managers ex-
propriate shareholders by diverting cash flows to inefficient investments. Aslan and Kumar
(2012) present a three-period model in which the endogenous choice of ownership concentra-
tion affects the cost of borrowing, probability of default, and the post-default restructuring.
Li and Li (2018) show, both theoretically and empirically, that better corporate governance
leads to higher stock returns during market upturns when firms have good growth options,
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but low stock returns in the downturns. In contrast to this literature, our paper studies the
joint effects and interactions of investor protection, expropriation, and ownership concentra-
tion, which give rise to distinct economic predictions.
2. The Economy with Investor Protection
We consider a pure-exchange continuous-time infinite-horizon economy with a representative
firm that produces one consumption good and is owned by two types of shareholders with
heterogeneous control power over the firm. In this Section, we discuss the firm, the financial
markets, and shareholder optimization problems.
2.1. Firms and Financial Markets
The uncertainty is represented by a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}, P ), on which
is defined a Brownian motion w. The stochastic processes are adapted to the filtration
{Ft, t ∈ [0,∞]}, generated by w. There is one representative firm in the economy which
stands for a large number of identical firms. The firm produces an exogenous stream of






where the output mean-growth rate µD and volatility σD are constants.
There are two types of shareholders, a controlling C and a representative minority M
shareholders. The representative minority shareholder stands for a group of identical share-
holders. Fractions lC and lM of the aggregate output are paid to the controlling and minority
shareholders as their labor incomes, respectively. The shareholders trade continuously in
two securities, a riskless bond in zero net supply with an instantaneous risk-free interest rate
rt and a stock in positive net supply, normalized to one unit. The stock is a claim to the
stream of dividends, which are paid each date t out of the net output after paying labor in-
comes, given by Dt = (1− lC − lM)D̂t. The dividend payout is determined by the controlling
shareholder, as discussed below. We focus on Markovian equilibria in which bond price, Bt,
and stock price, St, follow processes






where the risk-free interest rate rt, stock mean-return µt, and volatility σt are endogenously
determined in equilibrium, and the bond price at time 0 is normalized so that B0 = 1.
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2.2. Investor Protection and Shareholder Objectives
The minority shareholder does not have control power, and cannot influence the dividend
payout policy. The controlling shareholder can divert a fraction xt of the firm’s output
for himself. The remaining non-diverted output (1 − xt)Dt is paid as a time-t dividend.
The diverted fraction xt is constrained by investor protection in the economy, so that
xt ≤ (1 − p)q(nt), where p ∈ [0, 1] is interpreted as the protection of minority sharehold-
ers, with higher p indicating better investor protection, and q(n) ∈ [0, 1] indicating the
controlling shareholder’s power over the firm. Consequently, the above investor protection
constraint on fraction xt is determined jointly by investor protection p and the controlling
shareholder’s power q(n) over the firm. To simplify the analysis, we assume that q(n) = n,
so that the power over the firm is linearly increasing in the number of shares, and the con-
trolling shareholder has the same control and cash flow rights in the firm. In Section 5 and
the Internet Appendix IA.2, we consider alternative stealing technologies that temper the
incentives to divert output when the controlling shareholder’s stock holding is small.
The investor protection constraint captures the fact that better protection restricts the
set of available expropriation strategies. Controlling shareholders may divert output by em-
ploying a wide range of complex strategies rather than outright theft. For example, cash flows
can be tunneled through intra-group activities which can be economically large (Bertrand,
Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002; Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis, 2006; Khanna and Yafeh,
2007; Jiang, Lee and Yue, 2010). Companies can give each other, or to controlling share-
holders directly, high (or low) interest loans (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002),
pay special dividends to controlling shareholders (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000), engage
in abnormal sales (Jian and Wong, 2010; Lo, Wong, and Firth, 2010), sell assets below or
above their market values (Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis, 2006) and provide loan guarantees
(Berkman, Cole and Fu, 2009). One could also include jobs given to relatives, large bonuses,
perquisites etc. that are enjoyed by controlling shareholders as a form of wealth transfer
from minority shareholders.
The investor protection constraint also demonstrates that more power q(n) over the
firm makes it easier to orchestrate wealth transfers for private benefits by expanding the
set of available diversion strategies through various channels. First such channel is that
a higher stake in the firm gives the controlling shareholder better control over the board
and its decisions which allows implementing diversion strategies that would otherwise not
be possible. For instance, Anderson and Reeb (2004) analyze board composition of family
controlled firms and find that families often seek to minimize the presence of independent
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directors. The literature provides both empirical and anecdotal evidence of how controlling
shareholders divert firm assets to their private use without substantive interference from the
board (e.g., DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Enriques and Volpin,
2007). Second channel is that a higher stake thwarts possible takeover attempts by third
parties, widely considered as a market disciplining mechanism (Grossman and Hart, 1980)
in which poorly performing firms become targets for acquisition by third parties (perhaps
as a result of extraction of private benefits). Consistent with this argument Stulz (1988)
shows that an increase in the fraction of voting rights controlled by management decreases
the probability of a successful tender offer, mitigating the disciplining role played by outside
takeover threats. Anti-takeover clauses are often used as part of governance indices (Gom-
pers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003). Third possible channel is that a larger stake of the controlling
shareholder deters a formation of large blocks by other shareholders who might oppose the
extraction of private benefits through better monitoring.2
We further assume that the controlling shareholder incurs a pecuniary cost f(x,D) from
diverting output because stealing is by nature inefficient, in line with the related literature
(e.g., Shleifer andWolfenson, 2002; Albuquerque andWang, 2008). The cost function f(x,D)
is an increasing function of the diverted fraction xt and net outputDt. Throughout the paper,





where the parameter k captures the magnitude of the cost. The pecuniary costs of diverting
output may include bribes, fines payable if controlling shareholders are caught stealing,
payments to lawyers and other expenses for arranging diversion schemes. The pecuniary
cost does not disappear from the economy but is paid to the minority shareholder either via
a government transfer or by the controlling shareholder.
In reality, there could also be non-pecuniary costs of diverting output such as disutility
from stealing due to social norms that promote fairness, honesty and morality (Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler, 1986), and loss of reputation. Such non-pecuniary costs reduce the
controlling shareholder’s utility without affecting the budget constraint. In Section 5 and
the Internet Appendix IA.3, we discuss an alternative formulation with non-pecuniary costs
and find that all our main economic mechanisms at play and results remain equally valid for
this alternative.
The investor protection constraint xt ≤ (1− p)nt and the cost function f(xt, Dt) capture
2We take the investor protection constraint as given. However, it would be of interest to microfound this
constraint as arising due to some underlying agency conflict between different groups of shareholders.
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different barriers to expropriation in the economy, and hence, lead to distinct economic
implications in equilibrium, as highlighted in Section 4.3 below. The former constraint
proxies for legal protection of minority shareholders that limits wealth transfer strategies.
In contrast, cost function f(xt, Dt) quantifies pecuniary costs of stealing.




, i = C,M, (5)
with the risk aversion parameters γM ≥ γC > 0. The controlling shareholder being less risk
averse is natural in our setting since a typical endogenous occupation choice model would
predict that less risk averse people self-select into entrepreneurial activities and become
controlling shareholders (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979).3 For tractability, we assume that
investors are guided by myopic preferences over current consumption c and wealth W , given
by:





where utility function ui(·) is given by (5), i = {C,M}, and ρ > 0 is a time-preference
parameter. Myopic preferences admit considerable tractability yielding closed-form solution
for the optimal portfolios (Section 3.1), and are widely employed in various contexts (e.g.,
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1990; Pastor, 2000; Acharya and Pedersen,
2004). They also help us focus on the effects of investor protection and abstract away from
hedging demands, which are more relevant for the portfolio choice literature.4
The preferences (6) have the additional benefit that, along with labor income, they make
our economy stationary in that both shareholders continue to have significant economic
impact in the long run (Section 3.2). The reason is that these preferences ensure that the
shareholders hold positive next-period financial wealthWt+dt at all times. Our economy then
becomes stationary because keeping the wealth Wt+dt positive restricts financial losses while
future non-financial labor incomes help investors gradually accumulate financial wealth even
when their current wealth is close to zero.5
3We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. Consistently, Hvide and Panos (2014) provide
empirical evidence that risk tolerant individuals are more likely to become entrepreneurs.
4Such preferences may also naturally arise in an OLG-type framework. Furthermore, in many models
logarithmic preferences give rise to investor myopia, similar to that in the objective function (6) (e.g.,
Detemple and Murthy, 1997; Basak and Croitoru, 2000). In particular, it can be shown that the value
function of a dynamic infinite-horizon consumption choice problem with logarithmic preferences has the
following structure: J(Wt, zt) = (1/ρ) ln(Wt) + J̃(zt, t), where zt is a certain state variable. Then, from
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the dynamic problem it is immediate to observe that solving
the dynamic problem is equivalent to solving a myopic problem with an objective function ρ ln(ct)dt +
(1− ρdt)Et[ln(Wt+dt)]. The objective function (6) retains the latter structure of problems with logarithmic
preferences but has the additional benefit of accounting for risk aversion γi.
5We note that our myopic preferences do not account for future labor incomes, and hence are not a
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2.3. Shareholders’ budget constraints and optimizations
Each shareholder chooses consumption cit, the number of shares nit, and the controlling
shareholder additionally chooses the fraction xt of diverted output for private consumption.
Each shareholder’s wealth at time t is given by Wit ≡ bitBt + nitSt, where bit is the number
of units of bonds in the shareholder’s portfolio. The shareholders’ dynamic self-financing
budget constraints are as follows:
dWit =
(





1{i=C}(xtDt − f(xt, Dt)) + 1{i=M}f(xt, Dt)
)
dt+ nitStσtdwt, (7)
where St(µt−rt)+(1−xt)Dt is the gross dollar excess return on the stock in absolute terms,
(1−xt)Dt is the dividend per share, liD̂t is shareholder i’s labor income, xtDt is the diverted
output, f(xt, Dt) is the pecuniary cost of diverting output, and 1{i} denotes the indicator
function.
The minority shareholder maximizes the following objective function over current con-




where the function VM(·) is given by equation (6) for i =M , subject to self-financing budget




where the function VC(·) is as given in (6) for i = C, subject to the budget constraint (7), the
investor protection constraint xt ≤ (1− p)nt and the maximum share constraint nt ≤ 1. An
important feature of our model is that we allow the controlling shareholder to dynamically
rebalance the portfolio of assets, consistent with empirical evidence on the dynamics of firm
reduced form of any intertemporal preferences (such as CRRA or Epstein-Zin). In settings with intertemporal
preferences, investors’ decisions are guided by their total wealth Ŵt = Wt+Lt, where Lt is the present value
of future labor income and Wt is financial wealth which can be negative. Nevertheless, the non-negativity of
wealth and the reduced role of future labor income in our model are in the spirit of models with intertemporal
preferences and non-pledgeability of labor income, which could also arise in our setting due to difficulties of
borrowing against stolen output and fully expropriating labor income in the event of investor’s default. In
these models, the constraint Wt+dt ≥ 0 is imposed to prevent investors with limited liabilities from defaulting
on risky positions (e.g., Detemple and Serrat, 2003; Chien and Lustig, 2010; Chabakauri and Han, 2019).
Moreover, due to the non-pledgeability of labor income its value is significantly reduced (e.g., Chabakauri
and Han, 2019), and the risk-taking decisions are driven by financial Wt+dt rather than total wealth Ŵt+dt.
Another common feature that these models share with ours is the stationarity of equilibrium, which arises
for the same reason that wealth Wt is positive at all times.
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ownership by controlling shareholders such as managers and board members (e.g., Denis and
Sarin, 1999; Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan, 1999). Finally, we note that the controlling
shareholders in our setting act as price takers and do not manipulate their firm’s stock price.6
3. Equilibrium with Investor Protection
In this Section, we first solve for investors’ optimal strategies in a partial equilibrium setting,
in which asset price dynamics are taken as given. Then, by substituting the optimal strategies
into the market clearing conditions, we obtain the dynamics of asset prices in equilibrium.
3.1. Shareholders’ Optimal Strategies
We now solve for the optimal consumptions and stock holdings of controlling and minority
shareholders. We first note that the maximization of objective functions (8) and (9) turns out
to be equivalent to separate optimization problems for consumption ct and stock holding nt.
7







whereas the optimal stock holding n∗Ct of the controlling shareholder and diverted fraction



























6This is due to the following reasons. First, their trading, consumption and stealing decisions do not
affect Sharpe ratios of their own stocks because all firms are small and have identical outputs driven by
the same Brownian motion wt. In such an economy, any deviation of a firm’s Sharpe ratio from that
of the market portfolio leads to an arbitrage opportunity (e.g., Basak and Croitoru, 2000), which can be
easily eliminated by minority shareholders who do not face any trading frictions. Second, we posit that the
minority shareholders cannot observe the stock demands of controlling shareholders and believe that firms
are identical and the controlling shareholders do not manipulate prices. Consequently, they are indifferent
to which stocks to hold. If they observe that the stock price of a particular firm k deviates from the prices
of other firms they assume that too many minority shareholders bought or sold stocks of firm k and trade
in the direction of eliminating the mispricing. As a result, the controlling shareholders do not attempt to
alter stock prices knowing that the mispricing will be eliminated, which confirms the beliefs of the minority
shareholders that all firms are identical and the controlling shareholders do not manipulate prices.
7To demonstrate this, we rewrite the second term in equation (6) for investor preferences as
Et[ui(Wi t+dt)] = ui(Wit) + Et[dui(Wit)], apply Itô’s Lemma to ui(Wit), where ui(·) is given by (5), and
then, after some algebra, we find that the optimal consumption and the number of shares solve two separate
optimization problems.
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subject to constraints xt ≤ (1 − p)nt and nt ≤ 1, and the optimal stock holding n
∗
Mt of the



















Solving for shareholders’ optimal consumptions, we find that consumptions c∗i are given by:
c∗it = ρ
1/γiWit. (13)
The shareholders’ consumption-wealth ratios are constant, similar to frictionless models with
logarithmic preferences.
Solving the portfolio choice problem of the controlling shareholder is complicated by the
presence of constraints on stock holding n and diverted fraction of output x, which renders
the value function (11) non-concave function of stock holding n. We proceed in two steps.
We first maximize the objective function JC(n; x) in equation (11) with respect to x, taking
the stock holding n as given, and find the optimal fraction of diverted output x∗(n). Then,
we substitute the fraction x∗(n) back into equation (11) and find the optimal stock holding
n∗C by maximizing the objective function JC(n; x
∗(n)). Proposition 1 below summarizes our
results in partial equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Partial equilibrium). The fraction of diverted output x∗t and optimal
stock holdings n∗it are given by:
x∗(nt) = min
(
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t ) (region 2),
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(15)
n∗Mt =



























and JC(n; x) is as in
(11). Moreover, the shareholders’ optimal consumptions are given by Equation (13).
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The optimal fraction of diverted output x∗(nt) is a hump-shaped function of the number
of shares nt, and is depicted on Figure 1. On one hand, the endogenous accumulation of
control power by the controlling shareholder relaxes the investor protection constraint and
allows him to divert more as his stock holdings increase. On the other hand, marginal benefit
of stealing decreases due to larger cash flow rights. Initially, the equilibrium level of stealing
increases as the controlling shareholders’ stock holdings increase. However, after the kink in
Figure 1 where the stock holding is sufficiently large, the amount of diverted output decreases
because the payout through dividends becomes a larger share of the total output, and hence
the incentive to divert output is weaker given the natural inefficiencies of stealing.
The hump-shaped relation between the diverted output and the number of shares is a
notable feature of our model. Previous literature focuses only on cases where the fraction
of diverted output is exogenous or is decreasing due to larger cash flow rights as in our
region 2 (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Albuquerque and Wang, 2008). Region 1 where
the diverted output increases with the stock holding n is in line with the evidence that
firms without controlling shareholders have higher valuations than firms with controlling
shareholders (Laeven and Levine, 2008). Therefore, when a firm transitions from being
widely held (when n ≈ 0) to being controlled by a large shareholder its value would go
down. On the other hand, Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) show that the firm
value increases with increases in the stock holding of the controlling shareholder, consistent
with a decreasing function x∗(n). However, we note that the latter work uses a cutoff level
of n = 10% to identify a firm as being effectively controlled by a shareholder, and hence
truncates the region where x∗(n) might be an increasing function of the stock holding n.
The controlling shareholder’s optimal stock holding n∗Ct in Proposition 1 captures the
tradeoff between the benefits and costs of diverting the output. The expression for stock
holding n∗Ct in Equation (15) differs across four regions in the space of the state variables.
Region 1 is such that the fraction of the diverted output is given by x∗(n∗Ct) = (1−p)n
∗
Ct, that
is, the investor chooses to divert the maximum possible fraction of output. In this region,
laws and regulations that protect minority shareholder rights is the binding constraint on
stealing. This is because marginal benefit from stealing is high with low ownership rights,
the constraint on stealing is tight because controlling shareholder’s power is low and the
pecuniary cost of stealing is low at low levels of stealing.
Region 2 is such that x∗(n∗Ct) = (1 − n
∗
Ct)/k, that is, the cost of diverting output kicks
in. In this region, the controlling shareholder has higher power over the firm which makes
the constraint imposed by investor protection relatively relaxed. On the other hand, high
stake in the firm reduces incentive to expropriate. Consequently, in this region, the cost
14









Optimal Fraction of Diverted Output x∗(n)
This Figure shows the tent-shaped optimal fraction of diverted output x∗ as a function of the
controlling shareholder’s stake n in the firm.
of stealing rather than investor protection determines the optimal amount of stealing. We
observe that, after simple algebra, the stock holding n∗C in region 2 can be rewritten in the
following equivalent way:
n∗Ct =









where x∗(n∗Ct) = (1 − n
∗
Ct)/k. Therefore, both types of shareholders hold a simple mean-
variance portfolio when the economy is in region 2, where the investor protection constraint
is not binding.8
Finally, we discuss regions 3 and 4. Region 3 is a point where (1− p)n∗Ct = (1− n
∗
Ct)/k,
and hence the two forces of diverting the maximum and the cost of stealing equate. Region
4 is where n∗Ct = 1, and hence the controlling shareholder has full cash flow rights and no
incentives to steal.
8This result follows from the envelope condition and is due to the fact that the derivative of objective
function JC(n;xt) in (11) with respect to xt is zero in region 2 because fraction of diverted output xt is chosen
precisely to satisfy the first order condition with respect to xt, that is, ∂JC(n;xt)/∂xt = 0. Therefore, the
first order condition with respect to stock holding nC is given by ∂JC(n;xt)/∂nt = 0, and hence, the optimal
stock holdings of controlling and minority shareholders are similar.
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3.2. Asset Price Dynamics in Equilibrium
In this subsection, we derive the equilibrium mean-return µt, volatility σt, risk-free rate
rt and shareholder stock holdings n
∗
it. The definition of equilibrium in our pure-exchange
economy is standard: the equilibrium is a set of processes rt, µt and σt, optimal stock and
bond holdings, n∗it and b
∗
it, and consumptions c
∗
it that satisfy the market clearing conditions
n∗Ct + n
∗
Mt = 1, (18)
b∗Ct + b
∗
Mt = 0, (19)
c∗Ct + c
∗
Mt = D̂t. (20)
All equilibrium processes are derived as functions of minority shareholder’s share in the
aggregate consumption, defined as yt = c
∗
Mt/D̂t. Similarly to the literature on equilibrium
with heterogeneous investors (e.g., Chabakauri, 2013) the consumption share yt of one of the
investors emerges as a crucial state variable that determines the dynamics of asset prices in
the economy. Following the literature, we conjecture and then verify that the consumption
share follows a Markovian process
dyt = µytdt+ σytdwt, (21)
where drift µyt and volatility σyt are determined in equilibrium as functions of yt.
To facilitate the intuition, we provide first the equilibrium in the benchmark economy with
full investment protection p = 1, and then compare it with the equilibrium with imperfect
protection. In the benchmark economy, the difference in risk aversions γC and γM is the only
source of heterogeneity between investors C and M .
Proposition 2 (Benchmark equilibrium with full protection p = 1). In the economy
with full investor protection p = 1 the shareholders’ optimal consumptions are given by (13).
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κbmkt = ΓtσD, (23)
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rbmkt = ytρ
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respectively, where Γt is the risk aversion of the representative investor, given by:
Γt =
1
yt/γM + (1− yt)/γC
. (26)
The minority shareholder’s consumption share volatility and drift are
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The distribution of consumption share y is stationary and its probability density function
(pdf) is given in closed form by:
ψ(y) = exp
{









where the constants a0, a1, ai > 0, and bi, i =M,C, are provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 provides in closed-form all the relevant equilibrium processes in the bench-
mark economy with full investor protection. We note several similarities of these processes
with those in comparable models with non-myopic investors. In particular, the equilibrium
processes depend on the risk aversion Γ of the representative investor, with the Sharpe ratio
and the consumption share volatility being given by the same expressions as in the com-
parable economy with non-myopic investors. Moreover, the stock return volatility exceeds
the output volatility, σbmkt > σD. We also note that the gross stock-mean return is given




t , as in the economy with non-myopic investors. Equation (22) reports
this gross mean-return net of the dividend yield D/S, given by the last term (22), to high-
light the effect of stealing entering through the dividend yield in the ensuing analysis. The
risk-free interest rate rt in (25) is, however, different from that in models with non-myopic
investors. Specifically, it does not have a prudence parameter of the representative investor,
and features additional terms that are proportional to shareholders’ income shares.
The equilibrium in our benchmark economy is stationary, in contrast to models with
non-myopic investors. The stationarity follows from the structure of the volatility σy and
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drift µy of the state variable process in equations (27) and (28). From these equations,
we observe that the volatility σy is zero at the boundaries y = 0 and y = 1, while the
drift is µy = lMρ
1/γM > 0 at y = 0 and µy = −lCρ
1/γC < 0 at y = 1. Therefore, the
boundaries y = 0 and y = 1 are repulsive. When the consumption share y approaches the
boundary, its volatility decreases and the drift pushes it back into the internal region. This
behavior at the boundaries indicates that none of the investors disappear in the long run.
The probability density function (pdf) of the state variable y is obtained in closed form given
by (30). As discussed in Section 2.2, the stationarity arises because the preferences require
the shareholders to maintain positive financial wealth and non-financial income allows them
to accumulate wealth over time.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium with imperfect protection). In the equilibrium with im-
perfect protection p < 1 the shareholders’ optimal consumptions are given by (13), and the
stock mean-return, Sharpe ratio, volatility, and the risk-free interest rate are given by:
µt = rt + σtκt −
(
1− x∗t
) 1− lM − lC
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where κbmk, σbmk, rbmk, σbmky and n
bmk
C are the corresponding equilibrium processes in the full
protection economy given by (23)–(27), and (29), respectively. The controlling shareholder’s





























where x∗(n) is given by equation (14), µt, rt and σt are given by equations (31)–(33) and
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Proposition 2 derives the equilibrium processes (31)–(34) as functions of minority share-
holder’s consumption share yt and demonstrates that these processes are given by their
counterparts (22)–(25) in the benchmark economy, plus additional adjustment terms arising
due to imperfect protection. These adjustment terms depend on the fraction of diverted
output xt and the excess ownership concentration relative to the full protection benchmark,
given by n∗Ct − n
bmk
Ct . In contrast to the full protection benchmark economy, simple closed-
form expressions for stock holdings n∗it are no longer available. Imperfect investor protection
gives rise to complex dynamics of equilibrium processes via the effects of protection on the
stock holding of the controlling shareholder n∗Ct. In particular, stock holding n
∗
Ct now solves
a fixed-point problem in equation (37) in which the equilibrium processes on the right-hand
side of this equation are functions of n∗Ct itself.
The structure of the equilibrium processes in Proposition 3 is sufficiently tractable ad-
mitting several comparative statics. In particular, from equations (32) and (33) we observe
that the effects of investor protection on the stock Sharpe ratio κ and volatility σ depend on
the excess ownership concentration n∗Ct−n
bmk
Ct . Intuitively, one would expect that controlling
shareholders hold more shares under weak investor protection, and hence, n∗Ct−n
bmk
Ct ≥ 0, as
we confirm in Section 4 after computing the equilibrium. Therefore, the expressions for the
volatility (33) and the Sharpe ratio (32) suggest that weaker investor protection increases
volatility and decreases the Sharpe ratio relative to the full protection benchmark.
From equation (35) we also observe that the state variable volatility σy is negative because




Ct ≥ 0. Hence, the state variable y is negatively correlated
with shocks to output dw. As a result, this variable is countercyclical in the sense that it tends
to be higher (lower) during periods of negative (positive) output shocks dw which we label
as bad (good) times. The countercyclicality of y arises because the controlling shareholder
is under-diversified and less risk averse than the minority shareholder. Therefore, negative
output shocks hurt the controlling shareholder and benefit the minority shareholder so that
the minority shareholder’s consumption share y increases in bad times.
The economy with weak investor protection remains stationary because at the bound-
aries y = 0 and y = 1 the equilibrium processes coincide with those in the full protection
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benchmark, and hence the boundaries are repulsive as in the benchmark. This is due to
the fact that at both boundaries there is no stealing in equilibrium because at y = 0 the
economy is dominated by minority shareholders and at y = 1 it is dominated by controlling
shareholders who do not steal from themselves when they control the entire economy, as
discussed in Section 2. However, the pdf of the consumption share y is no longer possible in
closed form, and we compute it by Monte-Carlo simulation in Section 4. We also observe that
the consumption share yt is not a martingale because its drift µy is non-zero and is reverted
back into the interior of (0, 1) interval when yt is close to the boundary. Consequently, the
consumption share yt and all equilibrium processes which are functions of yt are predictable
over short time intervals.
We note that the endogenous accumulation of control and the participation of the con-
trolling shareholder in asset markets are key ingredients for explaining certain empirical
regularities. In particular, endogenizing the stock holdings allows us to explain the higher
ownership concentration in countries with low protection and shed light on the portfolio
choice between the risky asset, which provides higher control rights, and the riskless asset.
Furthermore, dynamic asset holdings generate endogenous wealth transfers between con-
trolling and minority shareholders which give rise to the stochastic time-variation in asset
returns and excess volatility. Finally, these asset holdings also give rise to the controlling
shareholder’s leverage and help us shed light on the role of leverage in the accumulation of
control and its effect on the stock return volatility.
4. Economic Implications of Investor Protection
In this Section, we present our results with plots as depicted in Figures 2-6 for a plausible set
of baseline parameters as functions of the consumption share y of the minority shareholders
in the economy.9 The state variable y is countercyclical, as discussed in Section 3.2, and
hence the dependence on this variable provides information on how the equilibrium processes
change over good and bad times in the economy.
Figure 2 presents the controlling shareholder’s equilibrium stock holding n∗C, the fraction
9We set µD = 1.5% and σD = 13%, matching the mean-growth rate and volatility of dividends (e.g.,
Brennan and Xia, 2001; Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal, 2009), and set γC = 3, γM = 3.5, ρ = 0.01, and
k = 3. We set the labor income shares to lC = 0.1 and lM = 0.5. The labor income shares capture the
fact that although individual controlling shareholders may have large incomes they are fewer than minority
shareholders in reality. Hence, their combined income is still lower than the income of minority shareholders.
We recall that the shareholders in our model are representative, that is, each shareholder stands for a group
of identical shareholders.
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of diverted output x∗, and the controlling shareholder’s leverage-stock price ratio for different
values of investor protection p in the economy, holding the stealing cost parameter k fixed.
Then, we use the results in Figure 2 for the analysis of equilibrium expected gross returns,
interest rates, and volatilities as depicted in Figure 3 for the same protection p and stealing
cost k parameters. Figure 4 presents the stationary distributions of the consumption share
y for the same sets of parameter values as in previous figures. Figure 5 explores the effects
of the stealing cost by varying parameter k and holding investor protection p fixed. Finally,
Figure 6 shows the expected stock gross returns and interest rates in an economy without
the investor protection constraint for a range of cost parameters k. The numerical approach
for deriving the equilibrium processes is explained in the Appendix.
4.1. Stock Holdings and Diverted Output
We start our analysis with Figure 2 presenting the controlling shareholder’s stock holding,
fraction of diverted output and leverage. Panel (a) of Figure 2 demonstrates that lower
protection tends to increase the controlling shareholder’s stock holding n∗C relative to the full
protection benchmark, i.e., n∗Ct ≥ n
bmk
Ct , in the region where the investor protection constraint
binds. This is because when investor protection is imperfect the controlling shareholder can
divert a larger fraction of output when he owns more shares. This gives the controlling
shareholder an incentive to acquire more shares in equilibrium when his consumption share
is low (i.e., y is high). However, when the controlling shareholder’s consumption share is high
(i.e., y is low), the stock holding is the same as in the benchmark economy, i.e., n∗Ct = n
bmk
Ct .
In this case, the controlling shareholder holds a large number of shares, which reduces the
benefits of diverting the output. Therefore, the economy is in region 2 (equation (15) of
Proposition 1), where the investor protection constraint does not bind and the diversion
of output is tempered only by the cost of stealing. The cost parameter k, however, does
not depend on the stock holding. Consequently, buying shares beyond the benchmark level
nbmkCt does not help divert more output and harms the controlling shareholder by reducing
portfolio diversification benefits. Hence, n∗Ct = n
bmk
Ct in region 2.
We note that the controlling shareholder’s stock holding n∗Ct is non-monotone in protec-
tion p. In particular, in panel (a) we observe that whether stock holding n∗Ct is higher in the
economy with p = 0.9 or p = 0.6 critically depends not only on the protection p but also on
the consumption share y. This is because an increase in p has two opposing effects on stock
holding n∗C. On one hand, stock holding n
∗
C decreases because the benefit of control is lower
when protection is high. On the other hand, the investor protection constraint becomes
21












































The effect of investor protection on controlling shareholder’s stock holding, fraction
of diverted output and leverage
This Figure shows the controlling shareholder’s equilibrium stock holdings n∗C , fraction of diverted
output x∗ and leverage-stock price ratio L/S as functions of consumption share y for different levels
of investor protection p and the baseline parameter values.
tighter thereby providing incentives to acquire more shares to relax it. Moreover, because of
a tighter investor protection constraint, region 1 in equation (15) for stock holding n∗C where
this constraint binds becomes larger.
Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows the fraction of diverted output x∗ and how it is affected by
investor protection. As would be expected, the fraction of diverted output is considerably
reduced in economies with better protection. The diverted output x∗(n∗Ct) has a kink at
the separation point of regions 1 and 2 in equation (15) for the stock holding n∗Ct, which
correspond to situations when the investor protection constraint xt ≤ (1 − p)nt is binding
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or not, respectively. The latter constraint is loose when n is sufficiently large, so that the
controlling shareholder does not want to steal from himself. Therefore, because the stock
holding n∗Ct is a decreasing function of consumption share y (panel (c) of Figure 2), the
economy is in region 1 (region 2) when y lies to the right-hand (left-hand) side of the kink.
We remark that all the equilibrium processes have kinks, which arise via the dependence of
the latter processes on the fraction of diverted output x∗(n∗Ct).
The economy transits from region 1 to region 2 following a sequence of positive shocks
dw > 0 because the controlling shareholder accumulates more wealth and stock. The econ-
omy moves from region 2 to region 1 if it is hit by bad shocks dw < 0 in which case the
controlling shareholder decreases his stock holding to finance consumption in bad times.
These transitions between the regions and the time-variation of the state variable y make
the diverted output x∗(n∗Ct) and all other equilibrium processes time-varying in our model.
Panel (c) of Figure 2 shows the controlling shareholder’s leverage-stock price ratio.
The leverage is given by the wealth invested in stocks in excess of total wealth. The







Ct and Lt = n
∗
CtSt −WCt, respectively. Then, taking into account
that the ratios Sbmkt /W
bmk
Ct and St/WCt are the same, conditional on the consumption share






+ n∗Ct − n
bmk
Ct . (39)
Equation (39) reveals that the excess ownership concentration n∗Ct−n
bmk
Ct is exactly equal to




t . Therefore, the acquisition of additional shares in
economies with poor protection is financed by personal leverage because, as shown below,
borrowing is cheap in such economies. Hence, the leverage increases, as shown on panel (c)
of Figure 2. We emphasize that the leverage here represents the personal leverage of the
controlling shareholder while the firm is unlevered.
4.2. Stock Return, Volatility, and Interest Rate
Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows that a higher investor protection p leads to a higher gross stock
return µ+(1−x∗)D/S, where µ is the mean capital gain and (1−x∗)D/S is dividend yield.
This finding is consistent with the empirical literature documenting a positive relationship
between corporate governance and realized returns. Future returns are positively correlated
with a governance index of shareholder rights (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003), lower
managerial perks (Yermack, 2006), a lower entrenchment index (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell,
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2009), and a governance index (AGR) from Audit Integrity (Daines, Gow and Larcker, 2010).
We note that these empirical findings are for cross-sections of firms with different investor
protections whereas our main analysis features a representative firm. However, our main
insights and intuition remain valid for a cross-section of firms, as we demonstrate in Section
5.3 below, albeit in a simple one-period setting.
Similar relations are documented in other countries and cross-country studies. Firms
with higher governance scores in Germany (Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann, 2004),
firms that do not engage in tunneling using inter-corporate loans in China (Jiang, Lee and
Yue, 2010) and countries with better legal institutions (Lombardo and Pagano, 2006) have
higher returns. Despite the supporting empirical evidence, it is not immediately clear why
such a relationship between expected returns and investor protection exists in equilibrium.
For example, taking away a constant fraction of dividends reduces the value of the firm but
does not affect the expected return in equilibrium. There is also an ongoing discussion about
whether the empirical relationship is robust (Core, Guay and Rusticus, 2006; Giroud and
Mueller, 2011; Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang, 2013). Therefore, further guidance from theory,
as a contribution to this debate, would be helpful.
To understand the intuition, we first consider the benchmark economy with full protection
p = 1. In this economy, gross stock returns are determined by investors’ risk aversions and
are sufficiently high to compensate investors for risk taking. Lower investor protection p < 1
opens up an opportunity to divert firm cash flows to benefit the controlling shareholders.
Therefore, the controlling shareholder is compensated for excessive risk taking not only via
risk premia but also via stealing. Consequently, the compensation for risk of the controlling
shareholder is determined by a new previously unexplored quantity which we refer to as the
effective risk premium, and which appears to be higher than the risk premium implied by
the stock price dynamics. More formally, from the budget constraint (7) of the controlling
shareholder C it is immediate to observe that his effective risk premium for holding stocks is
given by µ−r+(1−x∗)D/S+x∗D/(S n∗C), and hence, is higher than the risk premium µ−r+
(1−x∗)D/S for the minority shareholder by the diverted output yield per share x∗D/(S n∗C).
Therefore, a low risk premium µ−r+(1−x∗)D/S implied by asset prices is indeed consistent
with our equilibrium because the stock market clears due to high demand for stocks by the
controlling shareholders. Consistent with our intuition, it has been documented that the
demand by controlling shareholders for voting shares increases with poor investor protection,
which then affects prices.10
10This is consistent with the evidence that the value of control is negatively correlated with variation in
investor protection across countries (Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004) and over time (Albuquerque
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The effect of investor protection on stock gross returns, volatilities
and interest rates
This Figure shows the equilibrium gross stock returns µ + (1 − x∗)D/S, stock return volatilities
σ and risk-free interest rates r as functions of consumption share y for different levels of investor
protection p and the baseline parameter values.
Panel (b) depicts the stock return volatility σ and demonstrates that in our calibration
of the model it is higher than in the benchmark economy with full protection, i.e., σ ≥ σbmk,
and hence, the stock price is more volatile than output. This result is consistent with the
comparative statics in Section 3.2. The volatility increases because with imperfect protection
p < 1 the controlling shareholder holds more shares than in the full protection benchmark,
and hence is under-diversified. Therefore, his wealth and consumption are more volatile,
which then translates into the stock market volatility via the market clearing conditions.
and Schroth, 2010).
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We note an important link between the volatility and personal leverage. In particular,
combining equations (33) and (39) for the volatility and leverage, after simple algebra, we















ρ1/γM (1− n∗Ct) + ρ
1/γCn∗Ct
. (40)
Equation (40) explains the close resemblance of volatility σ and personal leverage-stock price
ratio L/S. Moreover, in our calibration, the latter equation implies a positive relationship
between the change in volatility and the change in personal leverage. When the investor
protection constraint does not bind, that is, the economy is in region 2, the equilibrium
stock holding n∗Ct is the same as in the benchmark economy, as elaborated in Section 4.1.
Consequently, equation (39) implies that there is no excess leverage in the economy in region
2, and hence equation (40) implies that the volatility is the same as in the full protection
benchmark.
Our analysis further uncovers previously unknown effects of investor protection on stock
return volatilities. First, in the region where the investor protection constraint is binding,
stock return volatility σ is a concave function of minority shareholder’s consumption share
y, consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Gul, Kim and Qui (2010). Second,
similar to the controlling shareholder’s stock holding n∗C, we observe that volatility σ is non-
monotone in protection p. This is because the interaction between volatility σ and protection
p depends on the minority shareholder’s consumption share y. Clearly, the income inequality
or distribution of wealth could have a direct effect on portfolio holdings of controlling versus
minority shareholders and our model implies that this would interact with the effect of
investor protection on equilibrium volatility.
Empirical evidence indicates that the idiosyncratic and total volatilities are higher in
more developed countries such as U.S. (Morck, Yeung and Yu, 2000; Bartram, Brown and
Stulz, 2012), where investor protection is also relatively higher. Indeed, minority investor
protection, property rights protection and opaqueness are suggested as likely culprits (Morck,
Yeung and Yu, 2000; Jin and Myers, 2006; Bartram, Brown and Stulz, 2012). Our model
can potentially shed light on this empirical relation between investor protection and volatil-
ity. For example, in economies where the stock holding of the controlling shareholder is
sufficiently high, and hence the corresponding consumption share y is sufficiently low, stock
price volatility can be higher in an economy with high level of investor protection (e.g., point
B in panel (b) of Figure 3) than in an economy with low level of protection (e.g., point A in
panel (b) of Figure 3).
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Stationary probability density functions of consumption share y
Panel (a) shows the probability density function of the minority shareholder’s consumption share y
for different levels of investor protection and the baseline parameter values. Panel (b) depicts for the
same parameter values the simulated distribution of the consumption share difference y(p1)−y(p2)
between two economies with differing protections p1 and p2 but otherwise identical in all other
respects, including the output shocks dw.
Panel (c) of Figure 3 shows that the risk-free interest rate r is lower in the economy
with poor protection. Because the risk premium faced by the minority shareholders is low,
investment in stocks is less attractive for them than in the economy with full protection.
Therefore, the minority shareholders run to the bond market, and hence, are willing to
provide cheap credit, which decreases the interest rates. Furthermore, the purchases of
stocks can be partially covered by the diverted output, which contributes to the decreases in
interest rates. The negative effect of stealing on interest rates is captured by the second and
third terms equation (34) for the interest rate r. We also observe that the gross stock return
and the interest rate have similar shapes, and their comparison shows that the interest rates
account for a significant fraction of the variation in gross returns. In particular, the ratio
r/(µ+ (1− x∗)D/S) ranges from 0.32 (when y ≈ 0) to 0.54 (when y ≈ 1).
From the results on Figures 2 and 3, we observe that the effects of investor protection
are more conspicuous when both investors have significant stock holdings, i.e, the economy
is away from the boundaries y = 0 and y = 1. Intuitively, when y ≈ 1 the controlling
shareholder accounts for a tiny fraction of aggregate wealth and consumption, and hence,
the effect of stealing is small. Furthermore, when y ≈ 0 the economy is dominated by the
controlling shareholder. As a result, the controlling shareholder holds almost all shares, i.e.,
n∗Ct ≈ 1, and hence, the diverted fraction x
∗




Ct) is small because,
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p = 1 p = 0.9 p = 0.6
E[y] 0.80 0.78 0.74
E[dS+Ddt
S
] 11.74% 11.38% 10.14%
E[r] 5.98% 5.76% 4.61%
E[σ] 13.08% 13.14% 13.17%
Table 1
Unconditional means of consumption shares, stock returns, interest rates, and
volatilities
This Table reports the unconditional means of consumption shares, stock returns, interest rates,
and volatilities for different levels of investor protection p = 1, 0.9, 0.6, and the baseline parameter
values.
given the cost of diverting the output, the controlling shareholder finds it sub-optimal to
divert the output of a firm in which he is entitled to almost 100% of cash flows. Therefore,
there is no diversion of output when y = 0 and the effect of investor protection vanishes.
Figure 4a shows the stationary probability density functions for the minority shareholder’s
consumption share y. The distribution of the variable y is stationary due to the presence
of labor incomes and the shareholders’ wealth being positive at all times, as elaborated in
Section 3.2. The distributions are not available in closed form, and so we compute them using
Monte-Carlo simulations of the consumption share y dynamics given in equation (21). These
distributions are shifted towards the boundary y = 1 because the minority shareholders as a
group receive higher labor income than the controlling shareholder. The distributions have
supports concentrated over a small interval [0.7, 0.85].
We use these stationary distributions to evaluate the unconditional means of consumption
shares, stock returns, interest rates, and volatilities, and report them in Table 1 for different
levels of investor protection. These unconditional means capture the following two effects of
investor protection. The first is the direct effect of lower protection holding the consumption
share y fixed, which is presented in our main analysis above. The second is the indirect
effect of investor protection through y and arises because lower investor protection shifts the
distribution of consumption towards the less risk averse controlling shareholder. We observe
that lower protection levels lead to lower unconditional means of consumption shares, returns,
and interest rates, and increases the volatilities. Consequently, accounting for the indirect
effect does not change our main results.
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We explore the indirect effect of investor protection further. Figure 4a and Table 1 indeed
demonstrate that lower investor protection shifts consumption towards the less risk averse
controlling shareholder, so that the minority shareholder’s consumption share y decreases
on average. Moreover, the pdfs of Figure 4a have little overlap, and hence, the consumption
share y randomly sampled from the distribution for p = 1 exceeds with a high probability
those sampled from the distributions for p = 0.9 and p = 0.6. Furthermore, Figure 4b
plots the simulated pdfs of the consumption share differences y(p1) − y(p2) between two
economies that differ in investor protections p1 and p2, but are otherwise identical in all
other respects, including the output shocks dwt (so that the effects are not confounded by
the differences in exogenous variables and shocks). We observe that y(p1) − y(p2) > 0 for
p1 > p2 with probability 1, and hence the consumption share of minority shareholders is
lower in economies with low protection.
From Figures 3a and 3c we observe that the stock mean-returns and interest rates are in-
creasing functions of both p, as discussed above, and of y, because the controlling shareholder
is less risk averse. As a result, when investor protection decreases, the stock mean-returns
and interest rates decrease because of lower p (direct effect) and lower y (indirect effect).
Consequently, the indirect effect reinforces the direct effect of investor protection. Similarly,
from Figure 3b we observe that in economies with high protection (p = 1, 0.9) the stock
volatility σ is higher for p = 0.9 than for p = 1, and is a decreasing function of y over the in-
terval [0.7, 0.85] where all consumption shares lie with probability 1, and hence, the indirect
effect reinforces the direct effect. In an economy with low protection p = 0.6 the volatility σ
exceeds the volatility for p = 1, and is an increasing function of y over the interval [0.7, 0.85],
and hence, the indirect effect partially offsets the direct effect, but the latter effect dominates
for our baseline parameter values and the volatility increases on average (Table 1).
We also note that consumption share y takes a broader range of values before its distri-
bution converges to the stationary one. Therefore, the comparison of the effects for different
levels of protection p conditional on the variable y should be performed for the entire interval
(0, 1). This conditional comparison has two economic interpretations. First, it reveals the
effects of an unanticipated change in investor protection p when the equilibrium processes
change in response to p but variable y has not yet adjusted to the new level. Second, such
a comparison reveals the effects of investor protection across economies that have different
levels of protection p but similar distribution of consumption.
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The effect of stealing costs on stock gross returns, volatilities, interest rates, and
stock holdings
This Figure shows the equilibrium gross returns µ+ (1− x∗)D/S, stock return volatilities σ, risk-
free interest rates r and stock holdings n∗C as functions of consumption share y for fixed investor
protection p = 0.6 and the baseline parameter values.
4.3. Effect of Stealing Costs
Figure 5 shows the effect of a change in the cost function parameter k on equilibrium processes
when the level of investor protection is fixed. It demonstrates that higher cost of stealing
(i.e., high cost parameter k) is associated with higher stock gross return and interest rate,
and lower volatility and stock holding of the controlling shareholder. Overall, the effect of
higher cost of stealing on equilibrium is consistent with the effect of better protection p.
A comparison of the results in Figures 3 and 5 reveals an important difference between
the economic effects of the protection p and cost k parameters on stock gross returns and
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interest rates. In particular, the change in protection p has stronger effects when consumption
share y is high (i.e., the economy is in region 1), while the change in stealing costs k has
stronger effects when consumption share y is relatively low (i.e., the economy is in region 2).
Intuitively, as can be formally seen from expression (14) for diverted fraction of output x∗,
this is due to the fact that lowering the cost of stealing k increases the diverted output x∗
only when the investor protection constraint does not bind, that is, when the economy is in
region 2 where the variable y is low.
The effect of the cost parameter k on the stock volatility and holdings is present only
when consumption share y is large, in contrast to the effect of k on gross stock return
and interest rate. The reason for such an asymmetry is as follows. When consumption
share y is low, the economy is dominated by the controlling shareholder, and hence, the
stock holding of the controlling shareholder n∗C is high. Therefore, the investor protection
constraint xt ≤ (1 − p)nt is not binding because the controlling shareholder does not have
an incentive to steal from himself. Hence, the economy is in region 2 where the diversion
of output is only tempered by the cost of stealing and the stock holding is the same as in
the benchmark economy. Consequently, the stock volatility equation (33) implies that the
volatility is the same as in the benchmark economy.
Furthermore, the cost parameter k has a significant effect on stock return µt and interest
rate rt in region 2 via the terms that depend on the fraction of diverted output x
∗
t =
(1−n∗Ct)/k in equations (31) and (34) when consumption share y is low. The intuition is that
despite the fact that n∗Ct = n
bmk
t in region 2, the wealth and consumption of the controlling
shareholder continue to increase at a higher rate than the wealth and consumption of the
minority shareholder due to the diverted cash flow x∗tDt in the budget constraint (7) of
the controlling shareholder. Therefore, the controlling shareholder extracts higher effective
returns from holding stocks, which affects the valuation of stocks and their returns.
Finally, to shed further light on the distinction between the effects of investor protection
constraint and the cost function we consider an economy without the investor protection
constraint so that stealing is only moderated by the pecuniary cost function. Figure 6
presents the gross stock returns and interest rates in such an economy for different values
of the cost parameter k. This figure shows that lowering the cost of stealing decreases asset
returns, consistent with the results in Figure 5 and the effects of weaker investor protection
in Section 4.1.
With the investor protection constraint absent, the volatility of stock returns and the
stockholdings of the controlling shareholder are driven only by the indirect effect of investor
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The effect of stealing costs on stock gross returns and interest rates when investor
protection constraint is absent
This Figure shows the equilibrium gross returns µ + (1 − x∗)D/S and risk-free interest rates r
for different levels of cost parameter k in the economy where the investor protection constraint is
absent, for the baseline parameter values.
protection (discussed in Section 4.2), and hence are not shown for brevity. This is because
region 2 is now the entire interval (0, 1) and the controlling shareholder’s portfolio in that
region is given by the same expression in terms of consumption share y as in the benchmark
economy, as discussed in Section 4.1. The cost parameter k affects the volatility and stock
holdings only via the distribution of the minority shareholder’s consumption share y. This
consumption share will be smaller in economies with low stealing costs where the controlling
shareholder has more consumption and wealth. As a result, the stockholding n∗C will be
larger in such economies. The effect of the cost parameter k on volatility σ is ambiguous
because σ is a non-monotone function of the variable y (panel (b) of Figure 3).
5. Extensions
In this Section, we discuss extensions of our main analysis that incorporate cross-firm dif-
ferences in investor protection, alternative stealing technologies, and non-pecuniary costs of
diverting output. The details of these extended formulations are provided in the Internet
Appendix.
Investor protection and cross-section of asset returns. For tractability, we adopt
a simpler, one-period economy, which allows us to study stock holdings and mean-returns
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but not stock return volatilities because they are equal to exogenous dividend volatilities.
This economy has two firms with exogenous outputs at the final date, given by D̃j = D(1 +
µD + σD∆wj), j = 1, 2, where ∆wj are shocks. Both firms have the same value in the full
protection benchmark because their outputs are ex-ante the same. Firm 1 has imperfect
investor protection, as in our main analysis, and firm 2 has full protection. The controlling
and minority shareholders trade both stocks and a riskless bond, and have CRRA preferences
as in the main analysis.
We show in the Internet Appendix IA.1 that our earlier results on stock holdings, mean-
returns, and interest rates remain valid. We additionally find that the firm with high investor
protection has higher return than the firm with low protection, consistent with the cross-
sectional empirical findings at Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Yermack (2006), Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), Daines, Gow, and Larcker (2010). The intuition is essentially the
same as in the main analysis and is based on the fact that the controlling shareholder is
compensated not only by stock 1 mean-return µ1 but also by the diverted output xD̃1.
Consequently, this shareholder invests more in firm 1 stocks relative to the benchmark, and
hence drives down its mean-return relative to the mean-return of firm 2.
Alternative stealing technologies. We explore the economic effects of alternative plau-
sible stealing technologies that temper the incentives to divert output when the controlling
shareholder’s stock holding nCt is small. First, we consider a formulation with a more elab-
orate control power q(n) = δmax(n − A, 0) + B, which incorporates specifications when
atomistic investors with small stock holdings are excluded from gaining control in the firm
(B = 0, A > 0, δ > 0). For comparison and generality, it also incorporates the possibility of
stealing by managers and other corporate insiders with no or little stake in the firm (B > 0),
and nests the linear control q(n) = n of our main analysis as a special case. Then, we con-
sider a formulation where the net stolen output is proportional to the stock holding nCt of
the controlling shareholder, which precludes atomistic shareholders from diverting output.
In this latter specification, the incentives to divert output near nCt = 0 are weaker than in
our main analysis, and are not dictated by the specification of the control power q(n).
We show in the Internet Appendix IA.2 that the main economic insights of our analysis
in Section 4 remain valid with these alternative specifications. In particular, as in our main
analysis, lower investor protection gives rise to higher ownership concentration and stock
return volatilities, and lower stock mean-returns and interest rates. The reason is that with
these specifications the controlling shareholder still has incentives to hold more stocks than
in the benchmark economy and the effects of the investor protection on equilibrium are again
determined by the excess ownership concentration n∗Ct − n
bmk
t > 0 (Proposition IA.1 in the
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Internet Appendix), as in our main analysis. Consequently, the results of Section 4 remain
valid with the alternative stealing technologies.
Non-pecuniary costs of diverting output. Our main analysis incorporates pecuniary
costs from diverting output. In the Internet Appendix IA.3, we provide an alternative
formulation with non-pecuniary costs of diverting output. Such intangible costs could arise
because of disutility from stealing due to social norms or loss of reputation. We take the
non-pecuniary cost function f(x,D) to be the same as the pecuniary cost given by (4),
where this cost is now interpreted as the certainty equivalent of utility loss due to stealing
and directly affects the controlling shareholder’s preferences:
Vi(ct,Wt,Wt+dt) = ρui(ct)dt+ (1− ρdt)Et
[
ui(Wt+dt − f(xt, Dt)dt)
]
,
where uC(c) is the utility function in (5). The controlling shareholder’s optimal portfolio
turns out to be the same as for the main analysis with pecuniary costs (15), because non-
pecuniary costs are subtracted from wealthWt+dt similarly to that of pecuniary costs reducing
wealth through the budget constraint. Moreover, all the effects of investor protection on the
equilibrium processes remain qualitatively the same as in Section 4. This is because the
pecuniary costs directly affect only the interest rate r and drift µy and have small effects on
these processes.
6. Conclusion
We develop a dynamic asset pricing model where a controlling shareholder can divert a
firm’s output but is constrained by investor protection and pecuniary costs of stealing. By
incorporating endogenous accumulation of control, we show that controlling shareholder’s
excess ownership concentration interacts with investor protection to determine equilibrium
level of stock mean-return, volatility and interest rates. We demonstrate that in equilibrium
the controlling shareholder’s asset concentration in the firm is larger with imperfect investor
protection. We also find that better investor protection increases stock mean-returns, and
increases stock return volatilities when ownership concentration is sufficiently high. Our
findings provide support for some of the empirical evidence on asset prices. However, it
would also be of interest to empirically investigate the link between the effects of investor
protection and the endogenous accumulation of control, as predicted by our model.
Our main analysis employs a preference specification that exhibits myopia. It would be of
interest to extend our analysis to the familiar case of dynamic preferences of Epstein and Zin
(1989) with heterogeneous risk aversions and unit intertemporal elasticities of substitution,
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in line with the literature on economies with heterogeneous investors (e.g., Gârleanu and
Panageas, 2015). However, such an analysis appears rather difficult because solving the
model is further complicated by additional hedging demands in shareholder portfolios, non-




Proof of Proposition 1. We observe that the controlling shareholder’s objective function
(11) is a quadratic function of the share of diverted output xt. Maximizing this function
with respect to xt subject to the constraint xt ≤ (1 − p)nt, we obtain the optimal fraction
of diverted output as x∗(nt) = min ((1− nt)/k; (1− p)nt). Substituting x
∗(nt) back into the







































































It is immediate to observe that the function JC1(nt) is a concave function of nt and
achieves a unique global maximum given by n∗Ct,1 in equation (15). In contrast, the function
JC2(nt) can be either convex or concave, depending on the cost parameter k. It achieves a
global maximum or minimum (depending on k) at point n∗Ct,2 in equation (15). Two other
potential points of global maximum are n∗Ct,3 = 1/(1 + (1 − p)k), where JC1(nt) = JC2(nt),
and n∗Ct,4 = 1 at which the constraint nt ≤ 1 becomes binding. We then determine the global






Ct,4 to find the point at which
the function achieves global maximum, which gives rise to equation (15). The minority
shareholder’s optimal portfolio (16) is easily obtained by maximizing the quadratic concave
objective function (12). 
Proof of Proposition 2. We consider the benchmark economy with full protection. Be-
cause there is no stealing in this economy, and hence xt = 0, both investors have the same
objective function (12) and their portfolios are given by
nbmkCt =















In what follows we omit the superscript “bmk” over the benchmark equilibrium processes
for convenience. Substituting the portfolios (A.4) and optimal consumptions c∗it = ρ
1/γiWit
into the shareholders’ self-financing budget constraints (7) with xt = 0, we obtain that their












where κt ≡ (µt − rt +Dt/St)/σt is the Sharpe ratio. Substituting the shareholders’ optimal
consumptions c∗it = ρ
1/γiWit into the consumption clearing condition (20), we obtain the
equation ρ1/γCWCt + ρ
1/γMWMt = D̂t. Applying Itô’s Lemma to both sides of this equation,
matching the dt and dw terms and then dividing both sides of the resulting equations by















= µD − ρ









Solving equations (A.6) and (A.7), we obtain the interest rate (25) and Sharpe ratio (23).
Next, we obtain the drift µyt and volatility σyt of the consumption share yt = cMt/D̂t.
Because cMt = ρ
1/γMWMt, the consumption share can be rewritten as yt = ρ
1/γMWMt/D̂t,
where WMt follows the process (A.5). Applying Itô’s Lemma to both sides of this equation
for the consumption share yt, and matching dt and dw terms, we obtain equations (27) and
(28) for σy and µy, respectively.
Towards obtaining the volatility σt and the trading strategies, we first derive the ratios
D̂t/St, WCt/St, and WMt/St. The ratio Dt/St is found using the market clearing condition














(1− yt)ρ−1/γC + ytρ−1/γM
.
(A.8)

























(1− yt)ρ−1/γC + ytρ−1/γM
. (A.10)
The market clearing in the stock and bond markets implies that the aggregate wealth
equals the value of the stock market, that is, WCt+WMt = St. From the latter equation and
the expressions for the optimal consumption c∗it = ρ









Applying Itô’s Lemma to equation (A.11) we find that σt = σD +(ρ
−1/γM − ρ−1/γC )σytD̂t/St.
Substituting σy from (27) and D̂t/St from (A.8) into the latter equation for σt we obtain the
volatility σt in equation (24). The stock return is then given by µt = κtσt + rt − (1 − lM −
lC)D̂t/St, which yields equation (22).
Finally, we obtain the optimal portfolios (29) by substituting the equilibrium processes
into equations (A.4). The processes µt, rt, and σt are substituted from (22)–(24), the ratio
Dt/St ≡ (1− lM − lC)D̂t/St is substituted from (A.8), and Wit/St from (A.9) and (A.10).













where a0 is a normalizing constant that makes the pdf integrate to 1. After some tedious






























































Substituting (A.13) into (A.12) and integrating, we obtain the pdf (30). Because aM > 0





ψ(y) = 0, and
∫ 1
0
ψ(y) < +∞, and hence, the pdf is well-defined. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Equation (31) for the mean-stock return µt follows readily from
the definition of the Sharpe ratio κt = (µt − rt + (1− x
∗
t )Dt/St)/σt and the expression (A.8)
for the ratio D̂t/St. Next, we derive the interest rate rt. The wealths of the controlling
and minority shareholders satisfy the budget constraints (7). Applying Itô’s Lemma to both
sides of the consumption clearing condition ρ1/γCWCt+ρ
1/γMWMt = D̂t, matching dt and dw


































From equations (A.15)–(A.16) and equations (A.9)–(A.10) for the ratios WC/S and WM/S
(which remain the same for the model with imperfect protection), we obtain:
rt = µD + ytρ
1/γM + (1− yt)ρ
1/γC − κtσD − lMρ
1/γM − lCρ
1/γC
−(1− lM − lC)x
∗
tρ







(ρ1/γM (1− n∗Ct) + ρ
1/γCn∗Ct)(ytρ
−1/γM + (1− yt)ρ−1/γC )
. (A.18)
From equation (16) for n∗M and the fact that n
∗
M = 1 − n
∗
C we find that κt = γMσt(1 −












Using exactly the same steps as above, we obtain the following expressions for σbmk and κbmk
in the benchmark economy:
σbmkt =
σD
(ρ1/γM (1− nbmkCt ) + ρ
1/γCnbmkCt )(ytρ













We next rewrite κt as κt = κ
bmk
t + (κt − κ
bmk
t ), where κ
bmk
t is given by equation (A.21).
Substituting (A.19) into the right-hand side of the latter equation, after some algebra, we





t ), where σ
bmk
t is given by equation (A.20). Substituting (A.18) into the right-hand
side of the latter equation, after some algebra, we obtain equation (33) for σt. Substituting
κt from (32) into equation (A.17) for rt, after some algebra, we obtain equation (34) for rt.
Next, we find the volatility σy and drift µy of the consumption share yt = c
∗
Mt/D̂t. Noting
that c∗Mt = ρ
1/γMWMt, we apply Itô’s Lemma to yt = ρ
1/γMWMt/D̂t and obtain σy and µy by
matching the dw and dt terms on both sides of the equation, as in the benchmark economy.
The controlling shareholder’s optimization problem (11) implies the fixed-point equation
(37) for the stock holding n∗C, in which the equilibrium processes depend on n
∗
C itself. The
ratios Dt/St and St/WCt in (38) are derived in the same way as in equations (A.8)–(A.10).
The ratio Dt/WCt in (38) is found by multiplying ratios Dt/St and St/WCt. 
Lemma A.1 (Equilibrium stock holding). The optimal stock holding n∗C,t of the con-


































1 + (1− p)k
, (region 3),
n∗Ct,4 = 1. (region 4),
(A.22)
Furthermore, for all consumption shares y ∈ [0, 1] there always exists n∗Ct,1 ∈ [0, 1], which
solves a third degree polynomial equation.
Proof of Lemma A.1. First, we find the stock holding n∗Ct,2 in region 2. The constraint












































The second line in (A.23) is zero from the first order condition for x∗t . Hence, we obtain:
n∗Ct =









Substituting κt from (A.19), σt from (A.18), Dt/WCt and St/WCt from (38) into the expres-









We note that n∗Ct,3 and n
∗
Ct,4 remain the same as in (15).
To obtain the stock holding n∗Ct,1 in region 1, we observe that by the definition of region












Substituting κt from (A.19) and σt from (A.18), Dt/WCt and St/WCt from (38) into equation
(A.26), after straightforward algebra, we obtain the first line of (A.22). It can be easily
verified that the left-hand side of the equation in the first line of (A.22) is lower than its
right-hand side for n∗Ct,1 = 0, and vise versa for n
∗
Ct,1 = 1. Therefore, by the intermediate
value theorem, there exists n∗Ct,1 ∈ [0, 1]. 
Numerical method for the main analysis in Section 4. First, we derive the optimal
stock holding n∗Ct as a function of the consumption share y in each of the regions 1, 2, 3,
and 4 in equation (15). Lemma A.1 above demonstrates the existence of the stock holding
n∗Ct and derives it as an implicit function of the consumption share yt, which can easily
be computed by solving a third-degree polynomial equation.11 Then, for each value of the
11As demonstrated in Lemma A.1, this polynomial always has a solution in the interval [0, 1]. Although
in general this solution may not be unique, we only obtain unique solutions in our calibration of the model.
Furthermore, because the objective function (A.1) may have regions of non-concavity, the optimal portfolio
holding n∗
Ct may appear to be a discontinuous function of y. However, such a discontinuity requires extreme
values of exogenous model parameters and does not occur in our calibration of the model.
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Ct,4 in turn into the objective
function on the right-hand side of (37) and find the element that maximizes the objective
function. This way, we obtain the optimal stock holding n∗Ct. Substituting n
∗
Ct into the
expressions for equilibrium processes in Proposition 2, we obtain all equilibrium processes
as functions of the consumption share y.
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Internet Appendix for “Investor Protection and
Asset Prices”
Suleyman Basak, Georgy Chabakauri, and M. Deniz Yavuz
In this Internet Appendix, we consider extensions of our analysis that feature cross-firm
differences in investor protection, alternative stealing technologies, and non-pecuniary costs
of diverting output. We find that the underlying mechanisms at play and our results on the
effects of investor protection remain qualitatively the same as in Section 4, and also uncover
additional insights due to these extended formulations. The proofs and the details of the
numerical methods employed are provided in Section IA.4.
IA.1 Investor Protection and Cross-Section of Asset Returns
The empirical literature on the effects of investor protection on firm stock returns is largely
cross-sectional. Hence, it would be valuable to extend our main analysis to feature an
additional firm with a different level of investor protection. However, such an extension turns
out to be intractable in a dynamic continuous-time setting due to cumbersome expressions
for equilibrium processes, an extra state variable, complex differential equations and fixed-
point problems for optimal stock holdings.1 Therefore, we adopt a simpler, one-period
economy. This economy lends considerable tractability to the analysis of stock holdings and
mean-returns but does not allow us to study stock return volatilities because they are equal
to exogenous dividend volatilities. For further tractability, we exclude pecuniary costs of
stealing to avoid non-convexity of the controlling shareholder’s optimization (discussed in
Section 3.1).2
We consider an economy with two dates, 0 and 1, and three equally likely states ω1, ω2,
and ω3 at date t = 1. There are two representative firms that produce equal outputs D at
the initial date and state-dependent outputs D̃1 and D̃2 at the final date t = 1, given by
D̃j = D[1 + µD + σD∆wj], j = 1, 2, (IA.1)
1The analysis of stock prices and volatilities is complicated even in frictionless economies with heteroge-
neous investors, where these processes are given by complex expressions in terms of special functions and
integrals (e.g., Chabakauri, 2013). Moreover, a dynamic two-firm setting requires an additional state variable
capturing the dynamics of the output share of one of the firms, which further complicates the analysis.
2We justify removing pecuniary costs as follows. First, these costs are introduced in our main analysis for
realism, and the economic effects are primarily driven by the investor protection constraint. Second, they
have similar effects on asset returns as investor protection constraint (Section 4.3). Third, firms are more
likely to differ in investor protection implied by corporate culture rather than in pecuniary costs such as
bribes, fines, and similar expenses that are likely to be determined at an economy level.
1
where the output mean-growth rate µD and volatility σD are constants, and ∆wj are economic









in states ω1, ω2, ω3, respectively. Their mean and variance are given by E[∆wj] = 0 and
var[∆wj] = 1, respectively, and the correlation is 0.5. The outputs (IA.1) are deliberately
chosen to be ex-ante identical to exclude confounding sources of firm heterogeneity.
The economy is populated by representative controlling and minority shareholders. The
shareholders trade in three securities, a riskless bond in zero net supply with interest rate r
and two stocks with prices S1 and S2, which represent claims to dividends paid by firms 1
and 2 at the final date, respectively. Hence, the underlying financial market is complete.
Firm 1 has imperfect investor protection. The controlling shareholder C of firm 1 can
divert a fraction x of this firm’s output, subject to the investor protection constraint x ≤
(1 − p)nC1, similar to our main analysis, where nC1 is this shareholder’s holding of stock 1.
Firm 2 has full protection. This firm may also have a controlling shareholder who manages
it. However, this shareholder cannot divert output, and hence faces the same portfolio and
consumption choice as a minority shareholder. Therefore, we subsume this shareholder and
all minority shareholders within the representative minority shareholder M of firm 1. In
an economy with full protection for both firms the stock prices are the same, S1 = S2,
because the outputs (IA.1) are equivalent from the viewpoint of date 0 before shocks ∆wj
are realized. Hence, the difference in investor protections is the only source of cross-sectional
variation in stock prices and returns in this setting.
The shareholders have preferences over initial and final consumptions c and c̃, given by:
ui(c) + β E[ui(c̃)], i = C,M, (IA.2)
where ui(·) are CRRA utilities given by (5) and β > 0 is a time-preference parameter. The
shareholders’ self-financing budget constraints are given by
c̃i = (Wi − ci)(1 + r) + ni1((1− x)D̃1 − S1) + ni2(D̃2 − S2) + 1{i=C}xD̃1, i = C,M, (IA.3)
where Wi denotes initial wealth.
The minority shareholder M maximizes the objective function (IA.2) with respect to
consumption c and stock holdings n1 and n2 subject to the budget constraint (IA.3). The
controlling shareholder C maximizes the same objective with respect to c, n1, n2, and diverted
output x subject to the budget constraint (IA.3), the investor protection constraint x ≤
(1− p)nC1, and a non-negative date t = 1 financial wealth constraint
W̃C = (WC − cC)(1 + r) + nC1((1− x)D̃1 − S1) + nC2(D̃2 − S2) ≥ 0. (IA.4)
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The effect of firm 1 investor protection on stock 1 mean-returns, investor protection
premiums, and interest rates
This Figure shows the equilibrium stock 1 mean-return µ1, investor protection premium µ2 − µ1
and risk-free interest rates r as functions of the consumption share y for different levels of firm 1
investor protection p and the baseline parameter values.
The latter constraint rules out unrealistic risky positions backed by future stolen output,
consistent with our main analysis where a similar constraint emerges due to shareholder
preferences over next-period financial wealth (Section 2.2).
We derive the equilibrium processes as functions of the consumption share y of the mi-
nority shareholder at date t = 0. Finding equilibrium reduces to solving a system of four
non-linear equations for the controlling shareholder’s consumptions in sates ω1, ω2, ω3, and
fraction x. These equations are significantly more complex than in the full protection econ-
omy where the system breaks down into separate one-dimensional equations for consumptions
in states ω. We solve the model numerically, as detailed in Section IA.4.
3
The effects of investor protection on stock returns, interest rates, and stock holdings are
in line with our main analysis. For brevity, we here only present the stock mean-returns,
defined as µ1 = E[(1 − x)D̃1]/S1 − 1 and µ2 = E[D̃2]/S2 − 1, which are the focus of the
related empirical literature, and also the interest rate r for comparison. Figure IA.1 reports
the mean-return µ1, spread µ2 −µ1, and interest rate r for different values of firm 1 investor
protection p and baseline parameter values.3 Panels (a) and (c) demonstrate that mean-
return µ1 and rate r are lower with weaker investor protection, as in our main analysis.
Panel (b) depicts the investor protection premium, defined as the spread µ2−µ1 between
the mean-returns of stocks with full and imperfect protection, respectively. This premium
is zero when both firms have full protection because the firm outputs are ex-ante identical.
Our key result is that this premium is positive when firm 1 has imperfect protection p < 1,
in line with the empirical evidence discussed in Section 4.2. The intuition is that if the
premium remains zero for p < 1 (i.e., µ2 = µ1) the controlling shareholder would be willing
to invest more in stock 1 to receive extra compensation in the form of diverted output xD̃1
thereby reducing the mean-return µ1. Hence the positive premium in equilibrium.
IA.2 Alternative Stealing Technologies
The controlling shareholder in our main analysis is able to divert output even with a small
stock holding nCt, and has strong incentives to do so around nCt = 0. Our main objective
here is to explore the economic effects of alternative plausible stealing technologies that
temper the incentives to divert when the stock holding nCt is small, and to demonstrate that
our results are not driven by the linearity of the control power q(n). First, we consider a
specification with a more general control power q(n), and then a formulation where the net
stolen output is proportional to the stock holding, which reduces the controlling shareholder’s
incentives to divert around nCt = 0 irrespective of the control power q(n) specification. We
show that the main economic insights of our analysis with these alternative technologies
remain the same as in Section 4.
We start with the analysis of a more general control function q(n) = δmax(n−A, 0)+B,
which incorporates the situation of a sufficiently large stock holding n being required to
gain control in the firm (B = 0), and hence, there being no stealing around nCt = 0. For
comparison and generality, it also incorporates the possibility of stealing by hired managers
and other firm insiders with no stake in the firm (B > 0), and nests the linear control
specification q(n) = n of our main analysis as a special case. The equilibrium processes with
3We set µD = 1.5%, σD = 13%, γC = 3, γM = 3.5, as in our main analysis, and β = 0.95.
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Equilibrium processes when control power is given by q(n) = max(n−A, 0)
This Figure shows the equilibrium stock holdings, gross stock returns, risk-free interest rates and
stock return volatilities for different levels of investor protection p and the baseline parameter values
when the control power is given by q(n) = max(n−A, 0), and A = 0.1.
this more general control power are given by the same equations (31)–(37) as in Proposition
3, but with a new diverted output x∗(n) = min
(
(1 − n)/k; (1 − p)(δmax(n − A, 0) + B)
)
.
It follows from the latter equations for the equilibrium processes that the effects of investor
protection are determined by the excess ownership concentration n∗C − n
bmk, as in Section 4.
The excess concentration n∗C − n
bmk remains positive with a non-linear control q(n) because
the controlling shareholder still has incentives to increase his stock holding relative to the
benchmark economy to gain access to stealing opportunities. As a result, the qualitative
effects of investor protection are similar to those in Section 4.
Figure IA.2 presents the controlling shareholder’s stock holding, gross stock mean-return,
5
interest rate, and the stock return volatility when the control power is given by q(n) =
max(n − A, 0) for the baseline parameter values and A = 0.1. In this economy, stealing
is not feasible for atomistic shareholders with small stock holdings. We observe that all
economic insights of our main analysis remain valid. In particular, low investor protection
increases the stock holding of the controlling shareholder and the stock return volatility,
and decreases the expected stock return and interest rate, relative to the full protection
benchmark. The main difference with Section 4 is that the equilibrium processes in the
economies with weak protection are the same as in the economy with full protection when
the consumption share of minority shareholders y is close to 1. This is because the stock
holding of the controlling shareholder is small when y ≈ 1, and hence stealing is not feasible.
For comparison, we next consider an economy where the control power is given by q(n) =
min(B + n, 1), and hence the company managers can divert output even with zero stock
holdings. Figure IA.3 reports the equilibrium stock holding n∗C, gross mean-return, interest
rate, and volatility in this economy. We observe that the results are qualitatively the same
as in our main analysis but the effects of investor protection have smaller magnitudes. In
particular, the stock holding n∗C is lower than that in our main analysis because the controlling
shareholder has less incentives to increase stock holdings. The main difference from Section
4 is that now the stock gross return (panel (b)) and interest rate (panel (c)) under weaker
protection are lower than those in the economy with full protection even when the stock
holding n∗Ct is close to zero around y ≈ 1.
Finally, we study an economy where the net stolen output is proportional to the stock






of net diverted output reduces the incentives to divert output when the stock holding n∗C is
low irrespective of the specification of the control power q(n). The equilibrium interest rate
and the optimization problem of the controlling shareholder in this new economy differ from
those in our main analysis due to the additional non-linearities of the net diverted output.
Proposition IA.1 reports the equilibrium.




Ct, the shareholders’ optimal consumptions are given by (13), the frac-
tion of diverted output is given by equation (14), the equilibrium stock mean-return, Sharpe
ratio, and volatility are given by equations (31)–(33) in Proposition 3, and the risk-free in-
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Equilibrium processes when control power is given by q(n) = min(n+B, 1)
This Figure shows the equilibrium stock holdings, gross stock returns, risk-free interest rates and
stock return volatilities for different levels of investor protection p and the baseline parameter values
when the control power is given by q(n) = min(n+B, 1).
terest rate is given by:
rt = r
bmk


















where rbmk is the equilibrium interest rate in the full protection economy given by (25), and
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Equilibrium processes with weaker incentives to divert output around n∗Ct = 0
This Figure shows the equilibrium stock holdings, gross stock returns, risk-free interest rates and
stock return volatilities for different levels of investor protection p and the baseline parameter values
































where µt, rt and σt are equilibrium processes and themselves depend on n
∗
Ct, and the ratios
Dt/WCt and St/WCt are given by equations (38).
Proposition IA.1 demonstrates that the equilibrium processes have similar structures to
those in our main analysis in Section 4. In particular, the processes are driven by the excess
8
ownership concentration n∗C − n
bmk, which is positive in this economy because the control-
ling shareholder still has incentives to increase stock holdings relative to the benchmark,
albeit these incentives are now weaker when n∗C is small. As a result, the effects of investor
protection on equilibrium remain qualitatively the same as in Section 4. However, the mag-
nitudes of the effects are smaller, especially when the stock holding n∗Ct is close to zero, due
to reduced incentives to divert output around n∗C ≈ 0. Figure IA.4 presents the equilibrium
stock holding n∗C, gross mean-return, risk-free interest rate, and volatility in this economy
and demonstrates the robustness of our results.
IA.3 Non-pecuniary Costs of Diverting Output
We here extend our analysis to feature non-pecuniary costs of diverting output, instead of
pecuniary costs in our main analysis. The non-pecuniary costs capture the possibility that
misuse of control power is more costly in terms of the required effort and reputation, or agents
feel disutility from stealing due to social norms that promote fairness, honesty and morality.
In particular, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) argue that people have a preference
for fairness and provide examples when economic agents commonly allocate resources fairly
to others even when they are free to do otherwise. Consequently, the controlling shareholder
may not only be limited by laws and regulations that protect minority shareholders but
also by social norms that promote fairness. These norms could be self enforced by personal
emotions or by others through disapproval, ridicule or ostracism (Posner, 1997). We capture
the effect of norms in the controlling shareholder’s decision to steal simply by incorporating
a disutility from stealing.
The non-pecuniary cost function f(x,D) is the same as the pecuniary cost given by (4).
However, this cost is now interpreted as the certainty equivalent of the disutility of stealing
and directly affects the controlling shareholder’s preferences:
VC(ct,Wt,Wt+dt) = ρuC(ct)dt+ (1− ρdt)Et
[
uC(Wt+dt − f(xt, Dt)dt)
]
, (IA.7)
where uC(c) is the utility function in (5). The controlling shareholder maximizes the objective
function (IA.7) subject to the investor protection constraint xt ≤ (1 − p)q(nt), maximum
share constraint nt ≤ 1, and the budget constraint. The utility of the minority shareholder
is as before, and the shareholders’ budget constraints are as follows:
dWit =
(
Witrt + nit(St(µt − rt) + (1− xt)Dt)− cit + liD̂t
)
dt+ 1{i=C}xtDt + nitStσtdwt,
(IA.8)
and no longer include the cost function f(x,D).
9
The optimal portfolio n∗C of the controlling shareholder in the partial equilibrium can be
obtained following the same steps as in Proposition 1 and turns out to be the same as for
the main model with pecuniary costs in equation (15). This is because the non-pecuniary
costs are subtracted from wealth Wt+dt, and hence their effect is similar to that of pecuniary
costs, which reduce the wealth through the budget constraint (7). However, the dynamics of
wealths in the economies with pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs, given by (7) and (IA.8),
are different.
The equilibrium can be derived along the same lines as in Proposition 3. The equilib-
rium processes are again given by equations as in (32)–(36) but without the quadratic costs
k(x∗t )
2/2. All economic effects of investor protection on the equilibrium processes remain
qualitatively the same as in the main analysis of Section 4. This is because the pecuniary
costs directly affect only the interest rate r and drift µy, and moreover, have small effects on




the costs affect the interest rate (34) has a magnitude smaller than 0.1% for our baseline
parameter values.
IA.4 Numerical methods and proofs
Numerical method for the model with cross-section of firms in Section IA.1.
For tractability, we solve the optimization of shareholder C subject to the financial wealth
constraint (IA.4) using the method of penalty functions. In particular, we incorporate the
latter constraint into the utility function by adding a penalty term β̃E[uC(W̃ )], where β̃ =
10−7 is a small penalty parameter. Economically, this term captures the disutility of violating
constraint (IA.4). We then maximize utility function uC(c)+βE[uC(c̃)]+ β̃E[uC(W̃ )], subject
to the budget constraint (IA.3) and investor protection constraint x ≤ (1− p)n. The latter
constraint always binds because there are no pecuniary costs of stealing, and hence x =
(1− p)n. We also use the fact that W̃ = c̃− xD1.
10

































































































Multiplying the budget constraint (IA.3) for shareholder C in turn by ∆w1 and then by










∗) + x∗)DσD + n
∗
2CDσD. (IA.13)
Noting that n∗1C = x






DσD = (4/3)E [c̃
∗
C(∆w1 − 0.5∆w2)] . (IA.14)
Let c∗M = 2Dy, and define date t = 1 consumption share ỹ = c̃
∗
M/(D̃1 + D̃2) in state
ω. Then, using the market clearing conditions for consumption, we find c∗C = 2D(1 − y),
c̃∗C = (D̃1 + D̃2)(1 − ỹ). Substituting consumptions in terms of the variables y and ỹ into






























































































We then solve equations (IA.15)–(IA.17) numerically along the following steps:
(i) For each value of y, consider equation (IA.15) for fixed δ. For each state ω, this is an
equation for one variable ỹ(ω), which we simply denote as ỹ. Solving it by the method
of bisections, we find ỹ(δ; x∗).
(ii) Substituting ỹ(δ; x∗) into (IA.16), we solve the latter equation using the method of
bisections and find δ(x∗).
(iii) Substituting ỹ(δ(x∗); x∗) into (IA.17), by the same method we find x∗.
(iv) Hence, we find date t = 1 consumption shares ỹ in all states ω.
(v) Then, we find c∗M = 2Dy and c̃
∗
M = (D̃1 + D̃1)ỹ. Substituting these optimal con-
sumptions into (IA.9)–(IA.11), we find the interest rate r, and stock prices S1 and
S2.
Proof of Proposition IA.1. The fraction of diverted output is given by xtnCt, the net
diverted output is (xtDt− f(xt, Dt))nCt, and pecuniary cost f(xt, Dt)nCt of diversion is paid
to the minority shareholder either via a government transfer or by the controlling shareholder.
The shareholders maximize preferences (6) over the current consumption and next-period
wealth subject to the following dynamic budget constraint:
dWit =
(





1{i=C}(xtDt − f(xt, Dt)) + 1{i=M}f(xt, Dt)
)
nCtdt+ nitStσtdwt, (IA.18)
Similar to our main analysis, the optimal consumptions are given by c∗it = ρ
1/γiWit. Applying
Itô’s Lemma to the market clearing condition c∗Ct + c
∗
Mt = (1 − lC − lM)Dt and matching
dt and dw terms, following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 3, we obtain
that the equilibrium processes for stock returns, Sharpe ratio, volatility, and the fraction of
diverted output are the same as in Proposition 3, the interest rate is given by (IA.5), and
the optimization problem of the controlling shareholder is given by (IA.6). 
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